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Shades
of democracy
By
Henry C K Liu
This article appeared in AToL on
July 16, 2003
On July 1, 2003, the sixth anniversary of establishment of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Chinese sovereignty,
half a million people marched peacefully in the center of Hong Kong,
with pre-arranged police permission, to demonstrate against the
autonomous SAR government.
The march was sparked by opposition to the proposed security law as
stipulated by Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's
mini-constitution. The march, expected to attract only about 30,000,
was not spontaneous, having been professionally planned months in
advance. It is not known why or how the Hong Kong government
underestimated the size of the demonstration by such a wide margin,
since demonstrations are required by law to seek prior police approval
and the sponsor has to give police an estimate of the expected crowd
for reasons of public order and safety. Had the British colonial
government been still in charge, a march of this magnitude would not
have been permitted and those who disobeyed would have been thrown in
jail, as attested by British response to protest events during the
Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. The question arises as to why
the police did not turn away additional demonstrators after the crowd
reached the pre-approved level. The former British-run Hong Kong police
would have most certainly done that and not allowed 500,000
demonstrators to amass in one single location, peaceful or not.
The marchers were energized under the all-encompassing banner of demand
for democracy. Yet many diverse groups participated, each representing
a separate special interest. Both the New York Times and the Washington
Post observed that dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and
ineffective government response to it was a major factor behind the
massive turnout.
Opposition to the proposed security law took many different forms. A
small number wanted outright withdrawal of the proposed law; many
others, accepting the need for a national-security law, merely wanted a
postponement of legislative vote to allow more debate on the details;
still others wanted various specific amendments important to their
particular interests. Most argued not against the need for
national-security legislation per se, but whether particular provisions
were unnecessarily restrictive while not contributing to legitimate
national-security needs. By some protesters, demands have been made
that are inherently contradictory to one another. Still others
entertain the delusion of toppling the SAR government with "people
power", or even bring an end to communist rule in China.
It is clear that the elitist SAR government, in its inexperience in
handling popular political dynamics, misjudged the public mood and
mishandled the situation, allowing it to turn into an appearance of
political crisis. It permitted diverse anti-government forces, each
with a different grievance, to unite into one single demonstration of
media consequence, highlighting disconnection between the government
and the popular will.
Ironically, this is the result not of a government being indifferent to
public sentiment, as the British colonial government historically had
been, but the result of a permissive, indecisive and timid government
with a high degree of autonomy from the central government. The public
wanted stronger political leadership in addressing the economic
problems the city has been facing since the Asian financial crisis that
began in 1997, not less government. But the SAR government presents
itself as a laissez-faire polity.
Hong Kong spends billions of dollars on overseas public relations
through an army of high-priced lobbyists in key foreign capitals, but
very little on communication with the local population on the
grassroots level. It has failed to control even the government-owned
television station enough to portray the government in a fair and
respectful manner consistent with the Chinese cultural attitude toward
authority. Over the past six years, the government has been quick to
admit faults but slow to take control. It consistently implies that
firm governance and strong leadership are not desirable characteristics
of a government committed to free markets and democracy. It preaches
the jungle laws of free market as an excuse for policy inaction. The
chief executive (CE) earnestly consults all who have an opinion, and
tries to accommodate all contradictory demands. The result has been
policy paralysis while the economy dives. By trying to please all, the
CE ends up pleasing few.
The CE views his key role as appeasing the US demand for open markets
and introduction of US-style freedom and democracy in post-colonial
Hong Kong, turning himself into a hands-off Herbert Hoover while the
public cry out for an activist Franklin D Roosevelt. In dealing with
pressure from overseas, the CE acts like an appeasing Neville
Chamberlain rather than a defiant Harry Truman.
With the Wall Street Journal consistently assailing the SAR's mild
industrial-policy measures as destruction of a free market that
historically never existed, and the New York Times regularly harping on
never-existent political freedom, the SAR government has been consumed
with trying to project a facade of passive government as demanded by US
neo-liberalism, while letting the general public bear the economic pain
associated with such fantasy. Neo-liberal propaganda has orchestrated
the public to blame its misfortune not on globalized market
fundamentalism and US dollar hegemony, but on the political persona of
the CE on the narrow ground that he is a Beijing appointee. No one for
a century and a half ever complained that the British colonial
government had been, without exception, a London appointee. It defies
logic to link the selection process of the CE to the economic woes
brought on Hong Kong by market fundamentalism and dollar hegemony. But
the "free" press in Hong Kong never bothers to point out that simple
fact.
Under British colonial rule, both the Executive Council (Exco) and the
Legislative Council (Legco) were under the dictatorial control of the
British governor, with zero tolerance for dissent. The role of these
two "advisory" councils was limited to selling to the public the
dictatorial policies of the British colonial administration, never to
show reservation, let alone opposition to them. The colonial subjects
merrily went along because their colonial education had taught them
that the omnipotent great white master knew better.
Now, under the SAR structure, the Exco and Legco members suddenly feel
that they are no longer obliged to support the policies of the CE. They
begin to assume the role of independent politicians with self-selected
independent constituents, often gaining political mileage by opposing
government policies and measures, covertly if not openly. This new
independence in a leftover political structure has made Hong Kong
practically ungovernable. And the government's own free-market
ideology, out of sync with its half-hearted industrial-policy actions,
transforms a public deeply disappointed by dismal economic realities to
an eager mob hostile, albeit so far peacefully, toward the government,
focusing on an allegedly incompetent CE, not withstanding that Hong
Kong could do much worse than having Tung Chee-hwa as its chief
executive at this moment in history. Tung is a decent, self-effacing
and quietly hard-working patriot who tries hard to make his many
friends around the world understand Hong Kong better. It is hard to
imagine from the known faces in Hong Kong politics anyone who would do
a better job than Tung. The position of chief executive of Hong Kong is
shaping up to be a nearly impossible and thankless job.
Yet the peaceful side of the protests carries with it dark clouds of
threats of large-scale violence that demonstration organizers freely
imply with the tone of political blackmail. The residual colonial
mentality within the government, particularly the civil service,
carries with it a tendency to ignore the public, coupled with a
permissive, hesitant and cautious government, has been exploited by
seasoned international democracy/human-rights activists who are highly
experienced in orchestrating massive demonstrations that have toppled
governments in the name of democracy in many countries, most of which
ended up in worse shape than before "democracy" took over.
Democracy, like motherhood, is supported by everyone. But democracy,
like motherhood, comes in many forms. There is the motherhood from
happy marriages, from unwed mothers, from rape victims, from women with
genetic defects or mental problems. Thus motherhood arrives in a
variety of social contexts that affects its desirability. The same is
true about democracy.
The word "democracy" does not appear in the US Declaration of
Independence, which is really a secessionist document. Nor does it
appear in the Constitution of the United States or the Bill of Rights,
or in president Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Thus when the US
promotes democracy all over the world, it promotes a slogan whose
meaning is far from well defined. For the Roman Catholic Church, whose
record on freedom and democracy has been embarrassing, to put it
kindly, to protest on behalf of freedom and democracy is a moral irony
of the highest order. For centuries, the Church of Rome was an
instigator of religious wars and inquisitions, a relentless agent for
thought control, heresy suppression and witch-burning, and an
intolerant persecutor of other religions. It has been the most powerful
purveyor of institutional anti-Semitism and a fervent supporter of
imperialism. The controversial relationship between Nazi Germany and
the Vatican under Pope Pius XII has not been forgiven by the victims of
Nazism. The Vietnam War was partly sparked by Catholic persecution of
Buddhists, perpetrated by a Catholic leader installed by French
imperialists under Catholic influence, with the encouragement of a
Catholic US president advised by Cardinal Spellman of Boston. To this
day, the Vatican does not permit communists to join the Church. Nazi
Party organization was modeled after the Vatican, with the party
central committee modeled after the College of Cardinals. There is no
democracy inside the Church.
The quarrel the Vatican has with China is not about religious freedom,
but about the issue of a national church not controlled from Rome, an
issue settled in France and England centuries ago with much bloodshed.
The Catholic Church's opposition to the proposed security law is not
about religious freedom but about the legitimacy of a Chinese national
church in Hong Kong. The issue of freedom is only a flimsy pretext.
Pope John Paul II, in the encyclical Centesimus Annus,
specifically criticizes the aspect of capitalism that is not placed in
the service of human freedom and the human family in its totality. The
Bishop of Hong Kong, whose congregation represents only 4 percent of
the population, strains credibility when he selectively protests
against loss of freedom while remaining silent about the human abuses
of capitalism, for which Hong Kong is a living example.
Communists also treasure democracy. They just do not appreciate the US
definition of democracy. Mao Zedong spoke of the New Democracy and
democratic centralism. Intra-party democracy is a subject of continuing
debate within the Chinese Communist Party. One of the slogans of the
demonstration in Hong Kong has been: "Return power/politics to the
people." Seriously speaking, returning power/politics to the people can
only lead to socialism in Hong Kong. Are the self-proclaimed
"Democrats" in Hong Kong really prepared for that?
Even Alexis de Tocqueville's concept of democracy changed over time. In
1830, he regarded democracy as a dynamic process, which required an
"equality of conditions" that was prevalent in America. In his view,
the democratic process - ie, the continuous evolution of social order -
would end only when all political privileges, including wealth
inequality, were eradicated. Ten years later, in his second volume of Democracy
in America published in 1840, a different image of democracy
prevailed: that of a leveling power that would not be restricted to
social order, but which would also challenge the right of material
property - in other words, democratic socialism. Furthermore, he saw
the danger that democracy could level any intellectual or
individualistic distinctions. The notion of "tyranny of the masses" was
troubling to Tocqueville.
Francis Lieber (1798-1892) came to Boston from Germany in 1827 and
settled in South Carolina. In his new home, he founded the academic
discipline of political science, inspired partially by the
dissatisfying conditions he found in southern US society, which was far
from the liberal concepts of democracy that he aspired to. He edited
the first edition of The Encyclopaedia Americana (1829-33). In
his books A Manual of Political Ethics (1838), Essays on
Property and Labor (1841), and On Civil Liberty and Self
Government (1853), Lieber maintained that liberty has to be
realized in and by institutions. The national state seemed to him the
natural vessel for liberty to prosper. In liberal thought, the state's
main function is to protect every individual's liberty, not just that
of the moneyed class. By being the ultimate instance to solve
conflicts, the state's role reflects far-reaching tensions between
liberty and equality, since pluralism requires relativism. Lieber saw
patriotism and democracy as natural partners. To Lieber, the idea of
liberty always collides with demands for equality.
It is not clear that these concepts of liberty and democracy have been
given much thought by the slogan-chanting demonstrators and their
programmed sponsors in Hong Kong.
A case can be made that the democracy movement in Hong Kong is the
fruit of a kind of motherhood that has resulted from cultural/political
rape of the colony by British colonialism and US neo-imperialism. Hong
Kong never enjoyed democracy of any kind until Britain was forced to
return Hong Kong to China. The people of Hong Kong never had any
experience with democracy of any form, nor had the subject been taught
in schools. Nor had they been allowed to develop any democratic
institutions during 150 years of British colonial rule. Thus the
instant democracy promoted by British/US interests since the signing of
the Sino-British Joint Declaration for the Return of Hong Kong in 1982
has been fundamentally a bogus Cold War institution for legitimizing
anti-China and anti-communist sentiments to extend neo-colonial control
in the former colony.
Democracy as an operating polity requires supporting institutions, such
as an established system of mature political parties with defined
ideologies, an informed voting public and a balanced press. The British
never permitted such institutions in colonial Hong Kong, let alone
nurtured them, until the Joint Declaration was signed in 1982.
Hong Kong does not have a balanced press in the English language even
now. All the major English-language newspapers in Hong Kong are hostile
to China and the Chinese political system. Freedom of the press is
limited to reports and commentaries critical of Chinese politics and
culture and hostile to China generally. The so-called free press in
Hong Kong is nothing more than an instrument of Western cultural
imperialism. There is no communist party in Hong Kong (illegal under
British colonial rule) and no government party such as the Liberal
Democrat Party (LDP) in Japan or the People's Action Party (PAP) in
Singapore. A two-party system does not exist in Hong Kong. The
government does not engage in political patronage to bolster popular
support for a government party.
Political parties were illegal in Hong Kong before 1990. There was
little incentive even to form them underground. Under British colonial
rule, both the Exco and the Legco were merely advisory bodies. Legco
members were either appointed by the governor or selected by functional
constituencies. Consequently, there was no need for political support
organizations. Politicians were business people or professionals
representing sectional interest groups. They were chosen on the basis
of loyalty to British colonialism rather than on political courage or
wisdom, and were expected to eschew anti-imperialist ideologies in
preference for enhancing factional interests under colonialism.
Political parties and politicians only started to appear after direct
elections for some Legco seats began in the early 1990s. Even today,
political parties in Hong Kong remain embryonic. The Democratic Party
has a membership of 590, smaller that the elective committee of 800
that elected the CE. The founding chairman of the party never faced
opposition candidates in party elections, making its commitment to
democracy a farce. Lacking power other than obstruction of
administration policies, there is little incentive to develop
meaningful policy platforms. The level of political debate consequently
tends to be rather unsophisticated and accusatory.
Hong Kong frequently compares itself to Singapore. The PAP in Singapore
was founded in 1954, and in the 1950s acted as a left-wing party of
trade unionists, whose leadership consisted of elite English-educated
lawyers and journalists and lowly Chinese-educated and pro-communist
trade-union leaders and educators. It won control of the government in
the crucial 1959 election to the Legislative Assembly, which was the
first election with a mass electorate and for an administration that
had internal self-government (defense and foreign relations remained
under British control). After a bitter internal struggle, the
English-educated, moderate and more pragmatic wing of the party
triumphed over the pro-communists in 1961 and went on to an unbroken
string of electoral victories, winning all the seats in parliament in
the 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980 general elections.
With a single party and set of leaders ruling the country for 30 years,
Singapore had what political scientists called a dominant party system
or a hegemonic party system, similar to the LDP of Japan or the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico. There were regular
elections and opposition parties and independent candidates contested
the elections, but after the early 1960s the opposition had little
chance of replacing the PAP, which regularly won 60-70 percent of the
popular vote. The strongest opposition came from the left, with
union-based parties appealing to unskilled and factory workers. In the
early 1960s, the union movement split between the leftist Singapore
Association of Trade Unions and the National Trades Union Congress
(NTUC), which was associated with Lee Kuan Yew's pragmatic wing of the
PAP. In 1963 the Singapore Association of Trade Unions was banned and
its leaders arrested as pro-communist subversives. The NTUC was
controlled by the PAP and followed a government-sponsored program of
"modern unionism", under which strikes were unknown and wages were, in
practice, set by the government through the National Wages Council.
Hong Kong, on the other hand, is still a political vacuum when it come
to party politics and will turn into political chaos if the CE and
Legco members are suddenly elected by universal suffrage without a
dominant government party.
The July 1 demonstration was described by the world media as a
political mass action. Yet politics is the art of the possible, and
political actions must have realizable objectives. As long as democracy
in Hong Kong is a synonym for anti-communist and anti-China
institutions, there will be no democracy, since no government can be
expected to welcome its own demise from mob rule manipulated by hostile
foreign forces. If the people of Hong Kong truly desire democracy, they
must demonstrate that their democracy is a patriotic democracy, not a
bogus Western democracy to perpetuate neo-colonialism.
China promised Hong Kong that there would be a period of "50 years
without change" after it assumed sovereignty in 1997. It is hard to
argue that the introduction of democracy in Hong Kong would not
represent a significant change. Either 50 years without change, or it
is an open season for change on all levels, including the abandonment
of the colonial legal system. Hong Kong has to pick which option it
wants. And it would be naive on the part of some in Hong Kong to think
that the "one country, two systems" policy can be manipulated into an
opening to topple the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland.
Narcissistic Hong Kong would do well to notice that public opinion on
the mainland on the superiority complex in Hong Kong is far from
positive. The wealth in Hong Kong came from what the British did not
haul off to Britain of what they had milked from China through Hong
Kong's compradore role during the age of imperialism and even now under
neo-imperialism. Now that Hong Kong is trapped by its dysfunctional
economic structure and its fixation on the merits of neo-liberal market
fundamentalism, it demands help and special privileges from China while
it continues to proclaim its residual colonial system superior.
Many of Hong Kong's economic woes are self-imposed. Hong Kong's
outdated currency peg got the economy into a boom-and-bust bubble. Now,
to maintain an unsustainable and undeservedly high standard of living,
Hong Kong looks to the mainland for help. To add insult to injury, it
has demanded such bailouts with a rejection of its minimal
responsibility for national-security legislation in the name of freedom
and democracy. Hong Kong has retained the title of the world's freest
economy since the free-economy index was first published in 1996 by the
Cato Institute and the Fraser Institute, yet its economy has dived
since 1997. This begs the question about the connection between freedom
and prosperity. Perhaps democracy advocates in Hong Kong should seek
help from the Cato Institute to save the distressed Hong Kong economy
(see The 'freest economies in the world' , July 12).
Hong Kong's aim to be a world financial center is a fantasy. The Hong
Kong market is too small to claim that status. The average daily
trading volume in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is about US$1 billion,
which is less than the trading volume of a single blue-chip share on
the New York Stock Exchange. Hong Kong makes much of its British common
law legal system, but in reality, since Hong Kong looks to China as the
source of its financial prowess, having a legal system disconnected
from China's is a hindrance, not an asset. No British company has come
to list its shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to take advantage of
Hong Kong's British legal system. The reality is that two major
commercial firms, both anchors of British imperialism, moved out of
Hong Kong before the territory was returned to China in 1997. Anyone
who thinks Hong Kong can compete with Shanghai as the financial center
of China is simply not thinking straight.
Speaking of being an international finance center, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority (HKMA) announced last Friday that the financial
secretary, following the advice of the Remuneration and Finance
Subcommittee of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee, had approved the
appointment of William A Ryback as deputy chief executive of the HKMA
with effect from August 27. Ryback will succeed David Carse, who will
leave the HKMA in September, as deputy chief executive in charge of
banking policy, development and supervision issues.
Ryback has considerable experience in both banking supervision and in
multilateral financial cooperation. Since 1986 he has held various
positions at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
where he was senior associate director before his departure last month.
Joseph Yam, chief executive of the HKMA, said: "Mr Ryback will bring
valuable knowledge and experience to the HKMA at a time when Hong
Kong's banking sector is undergoing change and development. His
expertise on multilateral supervisory cooperation is especially
relevant in an international financial center such as Hong Kong, and
his strong links with multilateral organizations will help the HKMA's
work at a time when new international supervisory standards are being
applied in Hong Kong." All this is without doubt.
Yet one can pose the question on whether there is any localization
program in Hong Kong at a time when all transnational companies are
actively implementing full-fledged localization all over the world,
particularly in Asia. Banking regulation is a fast-changing field where
experience more than five years old is only of academic interest. Why
is it that in the past six years the HKMA, under Yam, failed to
institute an affirmative program for local talent to assume the post
left by Carse, whose retirement had been anticipated? What kind of
international finance center is it that its Monetary Authority, Hong
Kong's non-central bank (on account of its currency peg to the US
dollar having relieved the HKMA of any central-bank monetary-policy
responsibility), has to go the US Federal Reserve to find a deputy
chief executive? Yet there is no protest or demonstration in Hong Kong
on this important issue, or on the issue why the chief executive of the
HKMA, whose central banking responsibility is automatically discharged
through the currency peg, should command a salary almost 10 times that
of Alan Greenspan, the real central banker of the United States. There
is a lot of misreporting in the international media that "people power"
scored a "victory" in forcing the government to postpone a vote in
Legco on the proposed security law. Even the Washington Post had to
acknowledge that the CE's hand had not been forced by "people power".
He postponed the vote after a key member of Exco, James Tien, chairman
of the Liberal Party, abruptly resigned, leaving the government with
insufficient votes in Legco to enact the law as scheduled.
Tien's behavior was a classic example of political treachery, a
cardinal sin in politics. If he had done what he did under a British
colonial governor, he would have lost his party chairman post before he
had a chance to resign and would have been branded a political and
social pariah within 24 hours by the all-powerful governor/dictator.
All firms that opposed British colonial government policy would have
put their commercial prospect in Hong Kong in immediate jeopardy.
The Co-operative Resources Centre, a loose grouping of 20 prominent
British gubernatorial appointees to Legco and Exco, formed itself into
the Liberal Party in July 1993. The platform of the Liberal Party calls
for "enhancing Hong Kong's international status; increasing Hong Kong's
economic competitiveness" and "to create wealth for Hong Kong, enlarge
business opportunities for all sectors, spur the adoption of modern
city planning, and enrich our culture and our educational endeavors".
Yet Tien called for "protecting the property market as the key to
recovery". He wrote in his capacity as party chairman on the party
website: "I want to see measures introduced which will produce a 50
percent increase in the current market value. Only then will business
as usual become, once more, the slogan of Hong Kong." It is hard to see
how artificially increasing the market value of Hong Kong's property
sector will increase Hong Kong's international competitiveness.
In another public message, Tien wrote: "The surest way to break old,
bad habits is to adopt a zero-tolerance approach in prosecuting
litterers, as well as introducing stringent measures to raise the level
of public environmental awareness and a sense of social
responsibility." This is the first time a zero-tolerance approach has
been advocated by anyone wearing a liberal badge.
Yet both of these demands have largely been accepted by the government,
of which the Liberal Party had been a major component supporter. As
early as last December 21, describing the proposed security law as "the
right time and the right law", James Tien wrote: "The past five years
have shown that those assurances [from China] have been honored. Hong
Kong continues to enjoy its freedoms, protected by common law and
guaranteed under the Basic Law. Therefore, this is the right time for
the SAR government to do what is legally required of it, namely to
enact laws to protect the fundamental interests of the state and
protect national security."
Yet, three days after the July 1 demonstration, and four days before
the scheduled vote on the proposed legislation, Tien abruptly resigned
by letter to the CE, not in person, and made his resignation known in
to the media hours later. His treachery created a crisis atmosphere
surrounding the governance of Hong Kong. The CE did not even have a
chance to ask Tien face to face: "Et tu, Brute?"
What are the possible scenarios after the "unexpected victory for
democracy advocates"? Already, there are press reports that Beijing has
sent a team to investigate the situation to seek a complete and
accurate understanding with which to prepare a proper response.
Whatever Beijing finally decides to do, and there may not be any
urgency, if only to dispel the misimpression that there is any real
political crisis, these democracy advocates have lost more than they
gained. By their agitation and manipulation of public discontent over
the economy, they have provided a legitimate channel for what they fear
most: intervention in Hong Kong's autonomy by Beijing, as evidence of
foreign instigation inevitably surfaces.
Even an inexperienced lawyer would have no difficulty building a case
that the Catholic Church in Hong Kong is directed from Rome, or that
human-rights groups in HK are directed from headquarters located
outside of Hong Kong, or that Hong Kong Falungong members are connected
with and supported by Falungong's international network.
The so-called democracy advocates have won a meaningless battle, but
they have lost the war of making Hong Kong more free and democratic.
They have given democracy a bad name in Hong Kong as a bogus slogan of
anti-China foreign intrigue. As a result, there will be less democracy
in Hong Kong, and a harsher final version of the security law will be
justified by these events, particularly if future demonstrations should
turn violent, as threatened by some misguided and overzealous
organizers. In the other corner, the government now will realize that
it must succumb to an age-old necessary evil of political patronage to
build a dominant government party along the path of the PAP of
Singapore or the LDP of Japan. A politically neutral and benign
government taking care of business is being dismantled in the process
by those blindly demanding bogus democracy while naive demonstrators
shouted slogans and waved candles for the international media.
Some have likened the recent demonstrations in Hong Kong to the events
at Tiananmen more than a decade ago. Aside from the mismatch of any
comparison, it should be remembered that the events in Tiananmen,
whatever verdict history finally pronounced on them, by going beyond
constructive bounds, undeniably and tragically set back progress on
democracy in China, with no winners. And the way the government handled
the situation saved China from the dismal fate of the Soviet Union.
All Tung Chee-hwa needs to do is to act as a strong leader that the
Basic Law empowers in the post of chief executive to steer Hong Kong
through this passing storm by adopting effective policies to
restructure and revive the economy. |
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