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G20
Summit
Missed the Real Target
By
Henry C.K. Liu
This article appeared in AToL
on April 14, 2009
Leaders of Group of 20 attending the second Summit on
Financial Markets and the World Economy in London on April 2, 2009,
echoing the
first in Washington DC in November 2008, continued the tradition of
superficial
posturing for political theater on global television, while missing the
real
target which is the need not so much as to revive dysfunctional trade
that has
collapsed from its own internal contradictions, but to redefine the
predatory
terms of international trade created by dollar hegemony.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, host of the G20
London
summit, declared it as having created a "new world order". While
unipolarity appears to be in the process of being replaced by emerging
multipolarity, the world is still a long way from developing a new
order. If
anything, the G20 London summit was a desperate last-gasp attempt by
the G7 to
restore a failed old world order.
Need for Restructuring Dysfunctional Terms of Trade
To save the world from a prolonged depression,
international
trade needs to be restructured from its current destructive role of
preempting
domestic development towards a new constructive role of augmenting it.
That the
now nearly two-year-old crisis in financial markets has been created by excessive debt denominated in a fiat
dollar whose issuer has for decades failed to live by prudent rules of
fiscal
and monetary discipline has been acknowledged by the new president of
the
United States only in passing during the summit, while the solution to
a
debt-infested financial crisis is mistakenly deemed to be simply
shifting
massive private sector debt into public sector debt by spending future
taxpayer
money to save zombie financial institutions from bankruptcy. This
approach of saving
the decrepit institutions of free market capitalism rather than saving
the
severely injured global economy will only exacerbate and prolong the
current
financial crisis into a decade-long global economic depression.
For all economies except that of the US whose fiat
currency
has the unfair and unearned advantage of being the dominant reserve
currency
for international trade, excessive national debt denominated in foreign
fiat
currency, either private or public, threatens the economic and
political sovereignty
of independent nations. When international trade is denominated in fiat
dollars, the US
essentially imposes a global tax on all trade around the world, whether
or not
the US
is a
direct participant in the transaction and whether or not the
transaction takes
place within US
jurisdiction. Foreign investment denominated in dollars, direct or
indirect,
naturally goes only to projects than can earn dollars, and not to where
the
target nation needs most for domestic development. Foreign investment
then serves
mainly the foreign investor, and only peripherally the target nation.
This is
why both foreign trade and foreign investment at levels beyond
augmenting
domestic development are undesirable and why nations should seek
alternative
methods of economic development.
Breaking Free from Dollar Hegemony
Dollar hegemony prevents all non-dollar economies from
financing domestic development with sovereign credit denominated in
their own
currencies and forces them to rely on foreign capital denominated in
dollars.
Moreover, the exporting economies are in essence shipping real wealth
created
by low wages and environmental abuse to importing nations that have
unearned
sources for dollars. The dollar-denominated trade surplus earned by the
exporting nations cannot be spent in the domestic economy without first
converting them to local currencies. But such conversion will create
inflation
since the wealth behind the new local currency has already been shipped
to the
importing nations.
Thus the exporting nations, while starved for capital,
have
to invest the dollars they earn from low wages and environmental abuse
back
into the dollar economy, enabling the importing economies to have more
dollars
to import more. Capital from the dollar
economy is in reality debt from the exporting economies. Yet such debt
will
return to the lending economies as foreign capital to invest in the
export
sector in a vicious circle. Dollar hegemony is in essence the venue for
a free
transfer of wealth from the poor economies to the rich economies. This
free
transfer of wealth hurts workers in both the poor and rich economies by
keeping
wages low through cross border wage arbitrage. Low wages then create
overcapacity unsupported by adequate demand in every economy.
When buyers and sellers are located within the same
country,
with settlements denominated in domestic currency, even with imbalance
of
payments, free trade is not predatory. But when buyers are located in
different
countries from sellers and trade is denominated in the buyer's fiat
currency
due to currency hegemony, trade is predatory in favor of the buyer even
if the
balance of payments is in favor of the seller. Essentially this is the
situation with US-China trade.
The False Promise of Market Fundamentalism
Market fundamentalism is the belief that the optimum
common
interest is only achievable through a free market equilibrium created
by the
effect of countless individual decisions of all market participants
each freely
seeking to maximize his/her own private gain and that such market
equilibrium
should not be distorted by any collective measures in the name of the
common
good. It is summed up by Margaret Thatcher's infamous declaration that
there is
no such thing as society.
The fact is that in a world of sovereign states, all
economies are command economies. The United
States, the Mecca
of market fundamentalism, commands its alleged market economy in the
name of
national security. While the US
tirelessly advocates free trade, foreign trade is a declared instrument
of US
foreign policy. President George W Bush declares that "open trade is a
moral imperative" to spread democracy around the world. The White House
Council of Economic Advisers is organizationally subservient to the
National
Security Council. National-security concerns dictate trade policies the
US
adopts for its economic relations with different foreign countries.
World trade today is free only to the extent of being
free
to support US
unilateralism. For the US
imperium, the line between foreign policy and domestic policy is
disappearing
to make room for global policy. The sole superpower views the world as
its
oyster, and global trade is to replace foreign trade in a global
economy the
rules for which are set by a World Trade Organization dominated by the
sole superpower.
Market fundamentalism as the term is generally used in
macroeconomics is a key component of neoliberal globalization of trade,
in the
same sense that the British, through Adam Smith, promoted "free
trade" in the 18th-19th centuries. The
difference between Smithian free trade and
today's neoliberal market
fundamentalism is that British free trade was limited to the sphere of
political influence within the British Empire,
whereas
neoliberal market fundamentalism aims to be truly global.
The Washington Consensus is a conditionality
for inclusion into global market fundamentalism through intervention on
national sovereignty over monetary and fiscal policies.
Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan's
former vice-minister for international finance, widely known as Mr.
Yen, in a
speech titled "The End of Market Fundamentalism" before the Foreign
Correspondent's Club in Tokyo
on January 22, 1999,
presented a
coherent and wide-ranging critique of global macro-orthodoxy. His view,
that
each national economic system must conform to agreed international
trade rules
and regulations but need not assimilate the domestic rules and
regulations of
another country, is heresy to US-led, one-size-fits-all globalization.
This
view was prescient in view of the globalized market conditions that had
led to
the current financial crisis and is at variance with that put forth in
the 2009
London G20 summit.
Market fundamentalism helps no economy. It helps only
selected segments in economies that subscribe to it.
Since the segment most helped by market
economy is in political control of the US
polity, market fundamentalism is billed as being the appropriate
doctrine for
the US
and
hence the world as well. Dollar hegemony is also detrimental to the US
economy, as it is only good for the global dollar economy of which the US
economy is but one component, albeit a key major one. Through
globalization and
the growth of euro-dollars (the name given to all offshore dollars
everywhere
and has no direct relation to the euro or the EU), the dollar economy
is
increasingly detached from the US
economy. What is good for the dollar economy is not necessarily good
for the US
economy. Economic nationalists in the US
are beginning to understand the threat of dollar hegemony to the US
economy itself.
G20 Summit
Sidetracked by Band-Aid Cures
While publicly avoiding the divisive issue of whether
to
push for more government fiscal stimulus to their politically separate
but
financially interdependent economies, the G20 leaders reached general
consensus
on regulatory reform to rein in systemic and institutional excesses in
risk-infested financial acrobatics that had led to the worst crisis in
financial markets in a century. The summit pledged $1.1 trillion in
emergency
aid to soften the adverse economic consequences without addressing the
real
target of needed reform, which is to correct the predatory terms of
trade based
on currency hegemony. While $1 trillion is no small sum, it amounted to
a
band-aid cure to a massive hemorrhage.
Washington Consensus Dead but not Buried
The London Consensus appears to have abandoned the
Washington Consensus, a term coined in 1990 by John Williamson of the
Institute
for International Economics to summarize the synchronized ideology of
Washington-based establishment neoliberal economists, reverberated
around the
world for a quarter of a century as the true gospel of reform
indispensable for
achieving growth in a globalized market economy. Economic neoliberalism
has
turned most trade-dependent nations into failed states. (Please see my
AToL
article: World Order, Failed States and Terrorism - PART 1: The
failed-state cancer)
Initially applied to Latin
America
and eventually to all developing economies, the term has come to be
synonymous
with globalized neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism to describe
universal
policy prescriptions based on free-market principles and monetary
discipline
within narrow ideological limits. It promotes macroeconomic control,
trade
openness, pro-market microeconomic measures, privatization and
deregulation in
support of a dogmatic ideological faith in the market's ability to
solve all
socio-economic problems more efficiently, and to assert a blanket
denial of an
obvious contradiction between market efficiency and poverty eradication.
Financial capital growth is to be achieved at the
expense of
human capital growth. Sound money, undiluted by inflation, imposed on
all by
the US who ironically is the most flagrant violator of the sound money
principle, is to be maintained by keeping wages low through structural
unemployment and cross-border wage arbitrage. Pockets of poverty in the
periphery are the necessary price for prosperous centers in the global
economy.
Such dogmas grant unemployment and poverty, conditions of economic
disaster,
undeserved conceptual respectability. Structural unemployment then
becomes the
vaccine against massive unemployment. Pockets of poverty become the
venue to
contain the spread of poverty. State intervention has come to focus
mainly on
reducing the market power of labor in favor of capital in a blatantly
predatory
market mechanism.
The set of policy reforms prescribed by the Washington
Consensus is composed of 10 propositions: 1) fiscal discipline; 2)
redirection
of public-expenditure priorities toward fields offering high economic
returns;
3) tax reform to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base; 4)
interest-rate liberalization; 5) competitive exchange rates; 6) trade
liberalization; 7) liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows;
8) privatization; 9) deregulation and 10) secure private-property
rights. These
propositions landed the world economy in recurring crises every decade,
each
bigger than the previous one, until the current crisis which is now
described
as the crisis of a century.
Of these ten propositions of the Washington Consensus,
the
G20 policymakers selectively called only for re-regulation and reform
on
uniform global standards on accounting, credit-rating and
risk-management for
banks, non-bank financial firms and hedge funds to prevent runaway
systemic
risk generated by aggregate externalization of unit risk. They left the
more
fundamental problematic propositions such as privatization, trade
liberalization and FDI liberalization untouched.
IMF Strengthened rather than Reformed
G20 leaders tripled the financial resources of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and offered less punitive cash loans
to
revive stalled trade to help affected governments, particularly those
of poor
countries, weather the effects of national insolvency such as surging
unemployment and drastic cuts in social safety net budgets. All these
measures
of reform around the edges of the problem no doubt are needed, but
their impact
will be meaningless without a fundamental restructuring of the
international
financial architecture built on currency hegemony.
China
Calls for New International Financial Architecture
Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of
China, the
central bank, raised the pertinent question:
The outbreak of the
current crisis
and its spillover in the world have confronted us with a long-existing
but
still unanswered question, i.e., what kind of international reserve
currency do
we need to secure global financial stability and facilitate world
economic
growth, which was one of the purposes for establishing the IMF?
The discussion on China's
proposal to create a new international currency based on IMF special
drawing
rights to replace the dollar was not on the summit agenda.
But "discussions on this subject in a
bilateral format" took place between China
and Russia.
IMF Special Drawing Rights
Instead of dealing with the pertinent question, the
G20
summit merely increased the resources of the IMF by $500 billion, plus
new
Special Drawing Rights allocation to be shared among its 185 members,
60% of
which going to industrialized countries that do not need it, and $100
billion
in increased lending by multilateral development banks. In addition,
there was
a $250 billion increase in trade credits to finance cross-border trade
that has
declined roughly 10% as a result of the credit crisis and the economic
downturn. An additional $6 billion to boost lending to the poorest
countries
makes the total of $1.1 trillion to deal with the financial crisis.
The United States,
still the world largest economy by far, has said it will contribute
$100
billion, pending Congressional approval. Japan
and the European Union each pledged $100 billion. China
is expected to contribute $40 billion, an excessive allocation if per
capita
GDP, rather than total GDP or foreign reserves, is used as a basis for
allocation.
The official statement issued at the end of the G20
summit
reads like an attempt to write new regulatory rules on free market
fundamentalism
to save capitalism from self destruction in a financially integrated
world
economy that has outgrown the ability of sovereign nations to keep it
from
structural implosion.
EU Demand for Global Regulation Rejected by US
But a European demand for sweeping global regulation
of
financial markets was rejected by the US.
While G20 leaders agreed to create a new Financial Stability Board to
monitor
the global financial system for signs of risks, they stopped well short
of
giving regulators cross-border authority as proposed by France.
Instead, G20 leaders agreed only to more closely coordinate their
regulation of
"systemically important" financial institutions, but failed to
endorse a proposed mechanism to resolve cross-border disputes that can
be expected
to arise in the continuing winding down of liabilities of insolvent
banks.
Instead of addressing the problem of toxic asset held by banks, G20
leaders
settled on an esoteric change in US accounting regulations that allows
banks to
defer write-downs in the value of their most troubled toxic assets to
mask
insolvency. "Regulation is still sovereign," declared US Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner.
Comparing 2009 to 1933
Comparison is made to the June 1933 London
Monetary and Economic Conference. Delegates
from 66 countries then gathered in London
to try to agree on plans to revive the world economy in the midst of
the Great
Depression. Organized by the League of Nations,
the G66
conference aimed at reviving stalled global trade and at stabilizing
commodity
prices by restoring the gold standard. The
1933 G66 conference took place in the grand Geological
Museum in London,
a testament to the solid value of gold, in contrast to the
warehouse-style
conference centre at Docklands as the venue for the 2009 G20 summit,
evidence
of the need of political leaders for protection from anti-trade,
anti-globalization protests from an angry, victimized people.
Hosted by UK Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, the 1933
G66
London conference was attended by 8 prime ministers, 20 foreign
ministers, 80
finance ministers and central bankers, and only 2 heads of minor states
- King
Faisal of Iraq and Swiss President Edmund Schulthess. The 2009 London
summit was attended by leaders of all G20 member states.
Within a month, the 1933 conference had collapsed,
torpedoed
by the opposition of the new US
President, Franklin D Roosevelt, to any agreements that would restrict
his
freedom to act boldly to revive the US
economy as part of the New Deal, essentially a domestic program.
Historians
have since suggested that the collapse of the 1933 London
conference engendered grave political consequences from economic
ramifications. France
and Britain
concluded that US
domestic politics was beset with isolationism and thus was an
unreliable ally
for dealing with international problems. Germany's
new Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, was forced by Anglo-Franco policy to seek
solution from economic autarchy, the success of which enabled
rearmament to
wash away the national shame of defeat. Protectionist trade barriers of
goods
were made more destructive by competitive devaluation of currencies.
Rising
unemployment in market economies contributed to socio-political
instability
across Europe that eventually led to war.
The 2009 G20 London summit is no doubt mindful of the
lesson
of the 1933 G66 London conference. Participants leaned over backwards
to
project an image of cooperative consensus. Whether such a happy image
bears any
resemblance to unfolding economic reality is another question.
Despite the symbolic absence of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt who purposefully went sailing, the US
played a key role in the 1933 conference, just as it did at the 2009
G20
summit. In both gatherings, the US,
despite being the most severely affected economy, was the most powerful
participant. In both gatherings, the US
was led by a new president. Unlike FDR, Obama appeared eager to go to London
more to use the occasion to demonstrate his hitherto untested
diplomatic skill
by meeting publicly with key leaders of major countries than to
demonstrate any
greater hope for international cooperation than Roosevelt
did.
As president-elect during the first G-20 summit in Washington
DC in November 2008
hosted by lame-duck
president George W. Bush, Obama said: "As this is a global economic
crisis, a coordinated global response is needed. And yet as we act in
council
with other nations, we must act immediately here at home to address America's
own crisis." In March 1933, FDR said in his inaugural address: "I
shall spare no effort to restore world trade by international economic
readjustment, but the emergency at home cannot wait on that
accomplishment."
While Roosevelt appointed Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, a
strong advocate of free trade, to lead the US delegation, watched over
by
Raymond Moley, trusted FDR personal representative, the new president
hedged his
bets by letting private US bankers, led by internationalist James
Warburg, to
begin secret negotiations on currency stabilization with European
central
bankers led by Montagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England. Hamburg
born Warburg famously told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
"We
shall have World Government, whether or not you like it. The only
question is
whether World Government will be achieved by conquest or consent."
National sovereignty has since emerged as the only
effective
defense on the part of weak economies against the predatory
internationalism of
the strong economies.
Obama’s Position on Trade
President Obama's position on free trade is hard to
decipher
since so far his words during election campaigns have not been
validated by his
actions in office. With NAFTA partner and Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper
at his side, Obama said, “We have to be very careful about any signals
of protectionism."
And to Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, he said: "Trade
is
an important engine for economic growth.”
China’s
Bilateral Currency Swaps
At the 2009 London G20 summit, the Brazilian
president, in a
bilateral meeting with Chinese president Hu Jintao, proposed a
bilateral
currency swap to facilitate trade to be entered into during a
forthcoming state
visit to China
in May.
A first step in this redirection of policy focus on
domestic
development is for China
to free itself from dollar hegemony. This can be done by legally
requiring
payment of all Chinese exports to be denominated in yuan to stop the
unproductive role of exporting for dollars that cannot be spent
domestically
without incurring heavy monetary penalty. Such a policy affects only
Chinese
exporters and can be implemented unilaterally by Chinese law as a
sovereign
nation, without any need for international coordination or foreign or
supranational approval. (Please see my July 30, 2008 AToL article: Breaking
Free
from Dollar Hegemony)
Cross-border exchange of regional currencies is an
important
step toward circumventing a shortage of dollars and other currencies,
as well
as reducing
exposure to exchange rate volatility. Developing countries in Eastern
and Central Asia as well as South
America
are beginning to recognize the Chinese yuan as an appropriate currency
for
bilateral trade settlements. In some cases, the yuan is beginning to
serve as a
reserve currency for bilateral trade.
Central banks in China
and South Korea
signed a 180 billion yuan currency swap framework agreement on December 12, 2008. The
People's Bank
of China entered into a 200 billion yuan swap with the Hong Kong
Monetary
Authority on January 20, 2009; an 80 billion yuan agreement with
Malaysia's
central bank on February 8; a 20 billion yuan deal with the National
Bank of
Belarus on March 11, a 100 billion yuan swap with the central bank of
Indonesia
on March 24, and a 80 billion yuan swap with the central bank of
Argentina. The
swaps will allow the parties to avoid using dollars in trade between
them and China.
Additional central banks have indicated a willingness to enter currency
swap
agreements with China
as well.
Currency swaps allow a central bank to inject a
counter-party’s
currency into its own financial system, allowing domestic businesses to
borrow
the other country's currency and use it to pay for imports of that
country's
goods, thereby easing the pressure on trade caused by an insufficiency
of
dollar. Technically, currency swap agreements are simply two-way loans
between
central banks. Foreign central banks generally use borrowed yuan to
settle
trades with China
or as a reserve currency. China,
on the other hand, uses foreign currency holdings as collateral.
Consequently,
regional circulation of the yuan expands with bilateral currency swaps.
The
system hinges on confidence in the yuan among all swap parties. As
liquidity of
the dollar, the generally accepted reserve currency for
international settlement since the establishement of
the Bretton Woods regime in 1945, dries up in the
current financial crisis, serious problems in credit and exchange rate
risks
have emerged. As a result, regional demand for trade settlement in
local
currency have appeared. As the currency of the largest economy engaged
in the
production of manufactured goods, the yuan naturally fills in as the
preferred
currency to respond to this demand. The scale of currency swaps is
determined
by market demand, not by currency hegemony.
“Buy American” Protectionism
Notwithstanding Obama's rhetoric against
protectionism, a
"Buy American" provision was left in his $787 billion stimulus bill;
and in the $410 billion omnibus spending bill that sets the budget of
many
government departments together. And a NAFTA-created pilot program
allowing
limited fleets of regulated Mexican trucks to use US highways was
cancelled, in
response to which Mexico
threatened to retaliate by imposing tariffs on US
goods, ranging from Christmas trees to pet food and toilet paper. "It
may
be difficult for us to finalize a whole host of trade deals in the
midst of an
economic crisis like this one," Obama said in apparent appeasement to
anti-trade labor leaders who constitute a central core of his political
coalition.
Economic slowdown is increasing pressure for
protectionism
and insularism in domestic politics in all countries. The US
is not exempt from such pressure, notwithstanding US
exceptionalism. For an economy that has been benefiting most from
international
trade, even as some sectors of economy, such as manufacturing, have
been forced
into painful restructuring, such domestic political pressure grows at
an
particularly dangerous time, as collapsing global trade can force the
economic
downturn into a much deeper and long-lasting depression. Yet the
predatory
terms of trade constructed under neoliberalism have generated strong
antitrade
sentiments in all countries. Neoliberal international trade has become
a class
struggle issue between the financial elite and the working poor in all
countries, rich and poor.
BRIC Countries
Unlike the US, the EU and Japan, the BRIC economies
(Brazil,
Russia, India and China) are in a position to take advantage of the
fall in
international trade to abandon excessive trade dependence to refocus on
domestic economic development, if domestic political pressure manages
to reject
the free traders that have been running their economies to the ground
for the
past three decades.
China
Adopts New Development Strategy
In the case of China,
a general consensus is emerging that excessive dependence on foreign
trade up
to over 70% of its GDP is neither sustainable nor desirable. Much of China's
developmental ills, such as wage stagnation, income disparity, regional
imbalance, environmental degradation, are direct results of excessive
dependence of foreign trade under current predatory terms of
international
trade under dollar hegemony.
International trade must be reformed to conform to new
terms
of trade so that trade will augment rather than obstruct domestic
economic
development. Under such new, equitable terms of trade, China
can raise the domestic segment of its GDP to 65% and lower the foreign
trade
segment to 35% without reducing current trade volume. Unfortunately,
trade
denominated in a hegemonic dollar prevents China
from utilizing sovereign credit in lieu of foreign capital to raise the
domestic segment of its GDP without first allowing its foreign trade
segment to
shrink from the current global financial crisis.
Free Trade Indefensible
The economic case for defending free trade in a global
market economy is not universally shared while it is politically
increasingly
difficult to make to injured domestic groups bearing unevenly the pain
while
not sharing equitably in the benefits of trade. Global labor has been
the prime
victim of globalized international trade.
The state of the world's trading system is of prime
concern
to the Obama administration. Yet, there is little sign that the Obama
administration is focusing on producing a truly salutary global trade
regime
that promotes balance and sustainable economic development for all.
Ironically,
to internationalists in the Obama administration, one frustrating
feature of
the current financial crisis is that it is so international in scope,
leaving
many elements and control points out of reach for US policymakers and
even
transnational financial institutions.
In a globalized interdependent economy operating still
under
the Westphalia order of independent sovereign
nation
states, national economies are falling into depression as connected
units of a
global economy without the benefit of world government. A revival of
global
trade without reforming the predatory terms of trade will remain an
empty
dream. G20 leaders need to understand that only economic development
can pull the
world out of this neoliberal financial morass of debt. Trade needs to
be
restructured to augment domestic development not to retard it.
Protectionism
against predatory trade is merely economic nationalism in a world order
of
sovereign nation states. Going forward, economic nationalism will
continue to
be the base, interdependence will only be the context.
US Populist Opposition to World Trade
In the US,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, appearing before the House
Financial
Services Committee, was warned by Chairman Barney Frank
(D-Massachusetts) that
it will be difficult to stop a rise in protectionist sentiment without
more
help for threatened workers. Congressman Frank noted a pattern of
"people
at the top of the economic pyramid being very critical of
protectionists. We
have had lectures that we should not give in to the instinct to try to
favor
American-made products and American jobs." Mr. Frank said free trade
arguments will remain unconvincing "as long as the American people feel
that
they do not fairly participate on the whole in the benefits of trade"
and
until there is a "broader social safety net" to help workers who lose
jobs and health benefits to global wage arbitrage.
This US
protectionist sentiment is shared by the people of all other nations.
FDR’s Monetary Reform
In the 1933 G66 London Conference, conservative
central
bankers in Britain
and France
wanted to return to the gold standard to preserve the value of their
currencies
even at the cost of lower wages and price deflation. Most pre-Keynesian
conservative economists argued that this approach, while temporarily
painful,
was the fastest possible way to end an economic depression.
FDR's New Deal chose to devalue the dollar to reduce
the
excessive debt burden and stimulate economic expansion with government
injected
liquidity through deficit financing. New Dealers had lost faith in Hoover's
approach of financial orthodoxy. Conservative historians have since
argued that Hoover, in
hoping to win a second
term, had in fact abandoned financial orthodoxy by intervening in the
collapsing financial sector to ease the panic, thus robbing the market
any
chance of self correction. Still, massive financial pain showered on
the masses
is never acceptable in politics and particularly in an election year in
a
democracy. Further, Hoover
was
forced to compromise on financial orthodoxy in order to ward off the
rise of
communism in the US.
Unfortunately, Hoover
began his monetary compromise to save capitalism too late and lost the
election
to Franklin D. Roosevelt. After the election, Hoover
bitterly charged Benjamin Strong, President of the New York Federal
Reserve
Bank, a job held 7 decades later by Tim Geithner, now Obama's Treasury
Secretary, with reckless placement of the interests of the
international
financial system ahead of US
national interest and domestic concerns. Strong sincerely believed his
support
for European currency stabilization also promoted the best interests of
the United States,
as post-Cold War neo-liberal market
fundamentalists also sincerely believe its promotion enhances US
national
interests. Unfortunately, sincerity is not a vaccine against falsehood.
The nature of and constraints on US internationalism
after
World War I had parallels in the rise of US internationalism after
World War II
and in US globalization after the Cold War. (Please see my November 27, 2002 AToL
article: Critique
of
Central Banking - Part 3b: More on the
US Experience)
FDR expanded the interventionist cure that Hoover
had begun. On January 31, 1934,
FDR by permission of Congress devalued the dollar, reducing its gold
content by
40%. It was a "beggar thy neighbor" devaluation policy antithetical
to the free trade ideas of Adam Smith. The first New Deal (1933-35),
aiming at
short-term relief programs for all groups, promoted economic planning
in
industry and agriculture in the Soviet style (some say the Italian
Fascist
style), and ran up against a reactionary Supreme Court. The second New
Dealers
(1935-38), including Justice Brandeis, whose fear of the stifling of
free
competition by big business was greater than his embrace of laissez
faire,
needed a respectable economic theory to support their spending program
in an
era of declining government revenue. They found him in John Maynard
Keynes,
through future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who introduced
Keynes
to FDR.
The New Deal legalized labor unios, established the
Work
Progress Administration (WPA) relief program, the Social Security Act,
and
programs to aid the agricultural sector, including tenant farmers and
migrant
workers. The Supreme Court ruled several programs unconstitutional.
Most of the
New Deal's relief programs were shut down during World War II by the
Conservative
Coalition. Many regulations were ended during the wave of deregulation
in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Several New Deal programs remain active,
with some
still operating under the original names, including the Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the
Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). The largest programs still in existence today
are the
Social Security System, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
and
Fannie Mae, albeit most of these program have been modified to reflect
the rise
of neoliberalism in US
ideology.
Market Fundamentalism and Inequality
Neoliberal market fundamentalist trade globalization
has
proved itself to be the mother of economic inequality. Bill Moyers, key
participant in President Johnson's Great Society that was tragically
aborted by
the Vietnam War, in a June 3, 2004 speech: The Fight of Our Lives,
given at the
Inequality Matters Forum at New York University, said: "Astonishing as
it
seems, no one in official Washington seems embarrassed by the fact that
the gap
between rich and poor is greater than it's been in 50 years - the worst
inequality among all western nations. Or that we are experiencing a
shift in
poverty. For years it was said those people down there at the bottom
were
single, jobless mothers. For years they were told work, education, and
marriage
is how they move up the economic ladder. But poverty is showing up
where we
didn't expect it - among families that include two parents, a worker,
and a
head of the household with more than a high school education. These are
the
newly poor. Our political, financial and business class expects them to
climb
out of poverty on an escalator moving downward."
The inequality that Moyers rightly protests about did not
start with the Republican second Bush administration. It started with
the
Democrat Carter administration's deregulation policies and the
neoliberal free
trade policies of the two-term Clinton
administration and Clinton's
adoption of the "Third Way"
radical centralism approach promoted by British sociologist Anthony
Giddens.
The overall aim of the Third Way
is, in Giddens's own words: "to help citizens pilot their way through
the
major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in
personal life
and our relationship to nature." Unfortunately, the Third
Way proved to be of little help
to the victims of
globalization or to protect nature from wholesale damage.
New Deal Protectionism
All through the New Deal, FDR protected threatened
sectors
of the economy, particularly agriculture, that had been hardest hit by
the
depression. Aware of the history of the struggle by the agricultural
populists
against the Gold Standard in favor of silver, FDR sent
a devastating telegram to the 1933 London G66
conference accusing it of bad faith and repudiating any attempt to get
a deal
to fix the value of currencies. "I
would regard it as a catastrophe mounting on a world tragedy," FDR
said,
"if the conference should allow itself to be diverted by a purely
artificial and temporary experiment... the focus on [currency]
stabilization
shows a singular lack of proportion and failure to remember the larger
purposes
for which the conference was called." And,
he added that "the old fetishes of so-called
international
bankers are being replaced by efforts to plan national currencies"
around
domestic needs. FDR's telegram, popularly received in the US,
caused the collapse of attempts to reach a coordinated international
approach
to the crisis.
For the organizers of the 2009 London G20 summit, the
lesson
of 1933 is that boosting market confidence by maintaining a united
front in the
face of the global recession has to be a key objective, independent of
concrete
policies that may well fail to reach agreement. Critics of summitry
warn that
the risk of failure, and its negative effect on confidence, is greater
than the
potential gain from a soothing image of international cooperation.
History has shown that international cooperation is
achievable only through the strong leadership of a dominant power with
the
economic and political strength to enforce a new world order. The
international
politics of US
hegemony was behind the success of the Bretton Woods regime of 1944
which
imposed the dollar as the world reserve currency for trade and created
the IMF
as the international lender of last resort and the World Bank as the
financing
institution for the development of poor economies. Similarly, hegemonic
leadership in the 1950s successfully initiated world trade negotiations
and
created the World Trade Organization.
But in the current financial crisis, as it was during
the
Great Depression, a weakened US has neither the economic strength, the
financial resources, the political will not the moral righteousness to
be the
lead organizer of a new world economic order. "By any measure, the London
summit was historic," President Obama declared grandiosely after the
one-day summit. The Wall Street Journal headline on the day before the
summit
read: "Global Slump Seen Deepening." And on the day of the summit,
the WSJ headline read: "Obama Hits Resistance at G-20" The need for
broad consensus is not a new US
policy epiphany; it is merely US
response to reality. Unipolarity is
finally being replaced by multipolarity in global geopolitics. In that
sense,
the 2009 G20 London summit was indeed historic.
In defense, Obama admits: “We won't solve the problem
of the
world in one summit.” Yet even a clear definition of the problem has
escaped
two summits thus far. The next summit is reported to be held in New
York in September. No
one expects the world economy to be in better
shape by then and the
prospect of more violent protests by angry citizens than those in London
is very real. By then Obama would have
worn off the excitement of being a new leader on his maiden diplomatic
excursion
and all world leaders may well be suffering from summit fatigue while
the world
economy sink deeper in crisis from its own structural contradictions.
April 9, 2009
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