Pathology
of Debt
By
Henry C.K. Liu
Part I: Commercial Paper
Market Seizure turns Banks into their own Vulture Investors
Part II: The
Commercial Paper Market and Special Investment Vehicles
This article
appeared in AToL
on November 28, 2007
Commercial paper is a short-term unsecured
promissory note
maturing in less than 270 days issued by banks for a fee on behalf of
corporations
and other borrowers to raise funds from investors with idle cash.
Commercial paper is a low-cost alternative to bank loans. Issuers are
able to
efficiently raise large amounts of funds quickly and without expensive
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration by selling paper,
either
directly or through independent dealers, to a large and varied pool of
institutional buyers. Competitive, market-determined yields in
notes
whose maturity and amounts can be tailored to specific needs, can be
earned by
investors in commercial paper. Commercial paper is usually
issued in
denominations of $100,000 or more. Therefore, smaller investors can
only invest
in commercial paper indirectly through money market funds or indirectly
through
their pension funds.
Commercial paper has
become an important debt market because
of the advantages of commercial paper for both investors and
issuers.
Commercial paper outstanding grew at an annual rate of 14% from 1970 to
1991, totaling
$528 billion at the end of 1991. Until the recent market seizure, the
commercial paper market was a $3 trillion market with half of the
market
consisting of bank-financed “conduits” of asset backed commercial paper
(ABCP).
The ABCP market shrank 13% in August 2007 as US
companies struggled unsuccessfully to raise short-term funds to roll
over
maturing outstanding debts.
Federal Reserve data showed an ongoing squeeze on
credit that
slashed ABCP outstanding by $194.7 billion in August 2007, $54.6
billion in
September, and $13 billion in the first two weeks of October. The good
news was
that the drop has been smaller as time went on. The bad news was that
the squeeze
was beginning to affect companies outside the financial sector. The
one-month
slump in August was the steepest in seven years.
Outstanding
commercial paper totaled $1.864 trillion in the
week of October 10, off sharply from a high of $2.186 trillion hit in
July.
Issuance of ABCP was again hardest hit, since the sector has the
greatest
potential exposure to mortgages.
Characteristics of
Commercial Paper
Securities offered
to the public must be
registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission according to the Securities Act of
1933. Registration requires extensive public disclosure,
including
issuing a prospectus on the offering. It is a time-consuming and
expensive process. Most commercial paper is issued under Section
3(a)(3) of the
1933 Act which exempts from registration requirements short-term
securities with
certain characteristics.
The exemption requirements have been a factor
shaping the
characteristics
of the commercial paper market. The key requirement for exemption
is
that
the maturity of commercial paper must be less than 270 days. In
practice, most
commercial paper has a maturity of between 5 and 45 days, with 30-35
days being
the average maturity. Many issuers continuously roll over their
commercial
paper, financing a more-or-less constant amount of their assets using
commercial paper. The nine-month maturity limit is not violated
by the
continuous rollover of notes, as long as the rollover is not automatic
but is
at the discretion of the issuer and the dealer. Many issuers will
adjust the
maturity of commercial paper to suit the requirements of an investor.
Notes must be of a type not ordinarily purchased
by the
general public. In practice, the denomination of commercial paper is
large:
minimum denominations are usually $100,000, although face amounts as
low as
$10,000 are available from some issuers. Typical face amounts are
in
multiples of $1 million, because most investors are institutions.
Issuers
will usually sell an investor the specific amount of commercial paper
needed.
That proceeds from
commercial paper issues can be used to
finance “current transactions”, which include the funding of operating
expenses
and the funding of current assets such as receivables and inventories.
Proceeds
cannot be used to finance fixed assets, such as plant and equipment, on
a
permanent basis. The SEC has generally interpreted the current
transaction
requirement broadly, approving a variety of short-term uses for
commercial
paper proceeds as proceeds are not traced directly from issue to
use.
Firms are required to show only that they have a sufficient "current
transaction" capacity to justify the size of the commercial paper
program.
For example, a particular level of receivables or inventory. Firms are
allowed
to finance construction as long as the commercial paper financing is
temporary
and to be paid off shortly after completion of construction with
long-term
funding through a bond issue, bank loan, or internally generated cash
flow.
Commercial paper is typically a discount security,
similar
to Treasury bills. The investor purchases notes at less than face value
and
receives the face value at maturity. The difference between the
purchase price
and the face value, called the discount, is the interest received on
the
investment. Commercial paper is, occasionally, issued as an
interest-bearing
note by request of investors. The investor pays the face value and, at
maturity, receives the face value and accrued interest. All commercial
paper
interest rates are quoted on a discount basis.
Until the 1980s,
most commercial paper was issued in
physical form in which the obligation of the issuer to pay the face
amount at
maturity is recorded by printed certificates that are issued to the
investor in
exchange for funds. A safekeeping agent hired by the investor held the
certificates, until presented for payment at maturity. The "settling"
of the transaction, (the exchange of funds for commercial paper first
at
issuance and then at redemption, occur in one day. On the day the
commercial
paper is issued and sold, the investor receives and pays for the notes
and the
issuer receives the proceeds. On the day of maturity, the investor
presents the
notes and receives payment. Commercial banks, in their role as issuing,
paying,
and clearing agents, facilitate the settling of commercial paper by
carrying
out the exchanges between issuer, investor, and dealer required to
transfer
commercial paper for funds. When new paper is not sold to roll over the
matured
paper, the bank must pay the investors of the maturing paper and hold
the
unsold paper in its own account until sold. This requires the bank to
record
the outstanding paper it holds on its balance sheet, increasing its
liability
that raises reserve and capital requirements, and lowering its profit
margin.
An increasing amount of commercial paper is being
issued in
book-entry form whereby entries in computerized accounts are replacing
the
physical commercial paper certificates. Book-entry systems will
eventually
completely replace the physical printing and delivery of notes. The
Depository
Trust Company (DTC), a member of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, a
limited-purpose trust company under New York
State
banking law and a
registered
clearing agency with the Securities and Exchange Commission, a clearing
cooperative operated by member banks, began in September 1990
converting most
commercial paper transactions to book-entry form.
The advantages of a
paperless system are significant.
In the long run the fees and costs associated with the book-entry
system will,
be significantly less than under the physical delivery system. The
expense of
delivering and verifying certificates and the risks of messengers
failing to
deliver certificates on time will be eliminated. As all
transactions
between an issuing agent and a paying agent will be settled with a
single
end-of-day wire transaction, the problem of daylight overdrafts, which
arise
from non-synchronous issuing and redeeming of commercial paper will be
reduced.
This electronic processing deprives issuers and creditors of precious
hours for
remedial response in a crisis.
CP
Market participants
Commercial paper is
issued by a wide variety of domestic and
foreign
firms, including financial companies, banks, and industrial firms.
Finance
companies are the biggest issuers. Finance companies provide
consumers
with home loans, unsecured personal loans and retail automobile loans.
They
provide businesses with a variety of short- and medium-term loans
including
secured loans to finance purchases of equipment for resale. Some
finance
companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of industrial firms that
provide
financing for purchases of the parent firm's products. For example, a
major
activity of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) is the
financing of
purchases and leases of General Motor's vehicles by dealers and
consumers.
General Electric Capital, and Ford Motor Credit are two other big
issuers.
The financial issuer category also includes
securities firms
and insurance firms. Securities firms issue commercial paper as a
low-cost alternative to other short-term borrowings such as repurchase
agreements and bank loans, and they use commercial paper proceeds to
finance a variety
of security broker and investment banking activities. Insurance
companies
issue commercial paper to finance premium receivables and operating
expenses.
Commercial bank
holding companies issue commercial paper to
finance operating expenses and various non-bank activities. Due to
declines in
the perceived creditworthiness of many major domestic bank issuers,
bank
holding companies have recently decreased their commercial paper
issues.
More than 500
non-financial firms also issue commercial
paper. Non-financial issuers include public utilities, service and
industrial
companies. Commercial paper is used by Industrial and service companies
to
finance working capital (accounts receivable and inventory) on a
permanent or
seasonal basis, to fund operating expenses, and to finance, on a
temporary
basis, construction projects. Public utilities also use commercial
paper to
fund nuclear fuels and construction.
Currently more than
1,700 companies in the Unites States
issue commercial paper. Financial companies comprise the largest group
of commercial
papers issuers, accounting for nearly 85% of the commercial paper
outstanding.
Financial-company paper is issued by firms in commercial, savings and
mortgage
banking; sales, personal and mortgage financing; factoring; finance
leasing and
other business lending; insurance underwriting; and other investment
activities.
The remaining commercial paper, around 15%, is issued by non-financial
firms
such as manufacturers, public utilities, industrial concerns and
service industries,
down from 25% in 1990.
Marketing Commercial
Paper
There are two
methods of marketing commercial paper. The
issuer can sell the paper directly to the buyer or sell the paper to a
dealer
firm, which re-sells the paper in the market. The dealer market for
commercial paper
involves large securities firms and subsidiaries of bank holding
companies.
Most of these firms also are dealers in US government securities.
Direct
issuers of commercial paper usually are financial companies which have
frequent
and sizable borrowing needs, and find it more economical to place paper
without
the use of an intermediary. On average, direct issuers save a dealer
fee of 1/8
of a percentage point, or $125,000 on every $100 million placed. This
savings
compensates for the cost of maintaining a permanent sales staff to
market the
paper.
In addition, direct
issuers often have greater flexibility
in adjusting the amounts, interest rates and maturities of issues to
suit the
needs of investors with whom they have continuing relationships.
Dealer-placed paper
usually is issued by nonfinancial companies and smaller financial
companies.
The size and frequency of the borrowings usually don't warrant
maintenance of a
sales staff by the issuer.
Interest rates on
commercial paper often are lower than bank
lending rates, and the differential, when large enough, provides an
advantage which
makes issuing commercial paper an attractive alternative to bank
credit.
Commercial paper rates are quotes on a discount basis. When any
security is
sold at a discount, the purchaser pays less than the face amount of the
paper.
The yield is the difference between the purchase price and the face
amount.
Daily interest rates
on commercial paper are reported weekly
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
covering maturities of 7 days to 180 days for dealer and directly
placed paper.
These rates are un-weighted arithmetic averages of offering rates --
the rates
at which dealers or issuers are willing to sell. The rates are reported
to the
New York Fed daily by seven direct issuers and five major dealers for
paper of
industrial firms with "Aa" bond ratings. Before averaging, fractions
are
rounded to two decimal places.
The most often cited rates on commercial paper are the 30-,
90- and 180-day dealer-placed paper rates, which are published weekly
by the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors in the “Selected Interest Rates”
H.15
statistical release. The report lists the most recent
week's daily rates and averages for recent weeks
and the preceding month. The five daily
figures are used to compute the average for a normal business week. A
four-day
average is used for a holiday week.
Commercial Paper
Rating Agencies
Five organizations
currently rate commercial paper. These
ratings have a strong influence on rates for commercial paper, although
the
published rates reflect only paper of companies with “Aa” bond ratings.
Standard and Poor’s Inc. rates about 1,700 issuers and Moody’s
Investors Services
Inc. rates more than 1,400 issuers. McCarthy, Crisanti, Naffei, Inc.
rates
about 650 issuers. Fitch Investor Services Corp. rates more than 240
issuers.
Duff and Phelps, Inc. rates more than 100 issuers.
Ratings are reviewed frequently and are determined by the
issuer’s financial condition, bank lines of credit and timeliness of
repayment.
Unrated or lower rated paper also is sold, but paper with the highest
ratings is
most widely accepted by investors. Investors in the commercial paper
market include
pension funds, money market mutual funds, governmental units, bank
trust departments,
foreign banks and investment companies. Only limited secondary market
activities
exist in commercial paper, since issuers can closely match the maturity
of the
paper to investors needs. If an investor needs ready cash, the dealer
or issuer
usually will buy back the paper prior to maturity.
Clueless S&P
Report on Commercial Paper Market
On January 31, 2007,
six months before the credit market crisis, Standard & Poor’s
issued a
report: US
Commercial Paper Outlook:
Steady Expansion, which predicted “US
commercial paper (CP) issuance to continue expanding at a strong
double-digit
clip in 2007, amid heightened investor interest. The inverted yield
curve––with
the 90-day commercial paper yield exceeding the 10-year Treasury by 53
basis
points (bps) at year-end––has pulled in players from the long end of
the
market. We expect to see rapid gains for both financial CP and
asset-backed
paper, though non-financial issuers are likely to slip into a measured
issuance
mode, as they reassess their working capital needs in a slow-paced
economy. In
the interim, the demand for short-term funding is continuing apace;
while
inventory rebuilding efforts are likely to mark time, the hectic pace
of
M&A should keep issuance elevated as firms work out their bridge
financing
needs. Our interest rate projections indicate little rollover risk for
issuers,
though investors could become more wary past mid-year. Risk and term
spreads
are razor thin at present, and this situation could persist until later
this
year, when the Fed embarks on rate cuts to mitigate against sub-par
growth.”
S&P was as wrong in its CP market prediction as it was on its
ratings on subprime
CDOs.
Total CP Outstanding
Total CP outstanding
rose by 21.5% in 2006 to $1.98
trillion. 2006 gains were evenly spread out, with a 29.6% gain for
non-financial
CP, a 26.5% gain for asset-backed paper and a 13.6% gain for financial
issuers.
S&P projected another banner year in 2007 for both financial and
asset-backed paper, but expected non-financial CP issuance to track a
more sober
1.8% growth path after the huge 2006 gain. At $171 billion,
non-financial CP issuance
was still quite anemic in 2006 relative to its high of $350 billion in
August
2000, accounting for just 8.9% of the market. Excluding foreign
issuance, this
share was only 7.4% (or $147.4 billion). The strong cash balance
position and
relatively inexpensive longer-term financing reduced reliance on
non-financial
CP issuance in recent years.
The growth had been
concentrated in asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP) which had been expected to post another outsized gain in
2007,
pushing such issuance toward the $1.3 trillion mark from an already
high $1.05 trillion
in 2006. The rising share of the market being securitized implies that
the
market was not yet mature. Standard & Poor’s expected
securitizations to
continue rising relative to the total. Basel II regulations were
expected to
boost ABCP, since the decrease in regulatory capital requirements for
off-balance-sheet exposures is viewed as a powerful incentive to
securitize.
From a credit
quality perspective, 2006 developments were already
mixed, with more downgrades (39 versus 37 in 2005) and more upgrades
(34 versus
19 in 2005). While S&P saw no
cause for immediate
concern, non-financial CP
ratings were a shade more negative in 2006. S&P noted that 25 CP
programs were
on negative CreditWatch, which were concentrated in the utility and
media and
entertainment sectors. Then the crisis of 2007 hit.
Bank Exposure
As investors shunned
commercial paper issued by finance
companies that were secured by asset-backed securities, the issuing
companies drew
on their bank credit lines to redeem the maturing paper and gave new
paper to
the banks for collateral. The New York Fed’s announcement clarifies
that its
discount window is prepared to accept these new commercial paper backed
by asset-backed
securities as acceptable collateral from banks for loans with which to
fund
bank credit lines to otherwise distressed borrowers.
Fed data show the
supply of ABCP slumped by a record $77
billion in the week to August 22. Overnight yields on top-rated
commercial
paper dropped 5 basis points to 6.04 percent but still up 78 basis
points in
the past 30 days. As of August 22, Fed
data show about 86% of all ABCP coming due within seven days, and about
50%
maturing overnight. Yields on the $1.2 trillion market for ABCP had
been rising
because the money market funds might have to liquidate assets quickly
to pay
back short-term debt. That could set off spiraling losses in the money
market
for other structured finance instruments even if synthetic
“mark-to-model” face
values had not yet been adjusted to “mark-to market” reality as the
housing
crisis deepens to further adversely affect the credit market.
About $125 billion
in ABCP had been withdrawn from the
market in September, a sign that banks were stepping in under their
liquidity
agreements to make good on their customers maturing debt in the
commercial
paper market.
Seasonally adjusted
outstanding commercial paper fell $90.2
billion to $2.04 trillion in the week ended Wednesday August 24, after
falling
$91.1 billion in the previous week. Most of the decline came in ABCP.
In
August, ABCP fell more than $170 billion from the level at the end of
July. The
previous monthly record was a decline of $78 billion in January 2001
that
signaled the “Early 2000s” recession identified by the National Bureau
of
Economic Research (NBER). As of the week of October 17, outstanding
commercial
paper was $1.88 trillion, down $300 billion from $2.18 trillion in the
first
week of August.
About 43% of the
assets in SIVs are financial institution
debt. If the SIVs were forced to make fire sales to raise cash, it
would drive
down prices and lift funding costs for banks, which could respond by
tightening
the supply of credit. Investors are demanding much higher yields on
bank debt
because of concern over the effect on their balance sheets of the
subprime
mortgage meltdown.
Citigroup, with
another $11billion of writedowns on its
holdings of subprime-related investments, was forced to pay 1.9
percentage
points more than US Treasuries in the second week of November, 0.7
points more
than a similar sale three months ago before the August liquidity crisis
on a
10-year $4 billion bond issue. Yields on financial bonds are on average
1.49
percentage points more than Treasuries, while the premium on industrial
bonds
is 1.34 points.
For the first time
since the beginning of the liquidity boom
several years ago, credit default swaps on financial companies are now
trading
in line with, or even wider than, industrial companies, costing more to
insure
financial debt against default.
After the August
liquidity crisis, Citigroup paid $25million
more in annual borrowing charges to raise $4 billion in 10-year fixed
rate
bonds compared with a similarly structured deal in February. It also
paid $5
million more in annual interest rate fees than a similarly structured
bond in
August, showing the outlook for the largest US
bank has deteriorated further from the height of the crisis at the end
of the
summer. In a further sign of falling confidence in the bank, insurance
for
Citigroup bonds against default in credit derivatives now costs more
than for
emerging market countries such as Mexico
and Malaysia.
Troubled bond
insurer ACA Capital Holdings is reported
facing credit rating cuts, which would set off a chain reaction
requiring banks
to put an estimated additional $60 billion of CDO obligations on their
balance
sheets. Standard & Poor’s reviewed ACA’s “A” rating in early
November when
the company reported a $1.04 billion third-quarter loss. ACA noted in a
SEC filing
in the third week of November that it would not meet collateral
obligation
requirements if its rating should fall below “A-”.
ACA is one of nine
key bond insurers threatened with credit
rating downgrade. Together, the nine are responsible for insuring
about $2.4
trillion of debt. Bear Stearns’ private equity group bought a 29% stake
in ACA
for $100 million in 2004. Market capitalization of ACA fell to $29
million
after its stock fell 93% in 2007. If ACA defaults, Merrill Lynch may
have to
take an additional $3 billion writedown from CDO exposure. Shares of
ACA fell
another 22.7% to $0.85 on November 21, while Merrill Lynch traded down
3.5% to
$51.81 and Bear Stearns dropped 2.8% to $91.28.
Next: The Credit Guns of August
heard around the world
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